130 research outputs found
Replacing Probability Distributions in Security Games via Hellinger Distance
Security of cryptographic primitives is usually proved by assuming "ideal" probability distributions. We need to replace them with approximated "real" distributions in the real-world systems without losing the security level. We demonstrate that the Hellinger distance is useful for this problem, while the statistical distance is mainly used in the cryptographic literature. First, we show that for preserving ?-bit security of a given security game, the closeness of 2^{-?/2} to the ideal distribution is sufficient for the Hellinger distance, whereas 2^{-?} is generally required for the statistical distance. The result can be applied to both search and decision primitives through the bit security framework of Micciancio and Walter (Eurocrypt 2018). We also show that the Hellinger distance gives a tighter evaluation of closeness than the max-log distance when the distance is small. Finally, we show that the leftover hash lemma can be strengthened to the Hellinger distance. Namely, a universal family of hash functions gives a strong randomness extractor with optimal entropy loss for the Hellinger distance. Based on the results, a ?-bit entropy loss in randomness extractors is sufficient for preserving ?-bit security. The current understanding based on the statistical distance is that a 2?-bit entropy loss is necessary
Improved Asymptotic Bounds for Codes Correcting Insertions and Deletions
This paper studies the cardinality of codes correcting insertions and
deletions. We give an asymptotically improved upper bound on code size. The
bound is obtained by utilizing the asymmetric property of list decoding for
insertions and deletions.Comment: 9 pages, 2 fugure
Uncorrectable Errors of Weight Half the Minimum Distance for Binary Linear Codes
A lower bound on the number of uncorrectable errors of weight half the
minimum distance is derived for binary linear codes satisfying some condition.
The condition is satisfied by some primitive BCH codes, extended primitive BCH
codes, Reed-Muller codes, and random linear codes. The bound asymptotically
coincides with the corresponding upper bound for Reed-Muller codes and random
linear codes. By generalizing the idea of the lower bound, a lower bound on the
number of uncorrectable errors for weights larger than half the minimum
distance is also obtained, but the generalized lower bound is weak for large
weights. The monotone error structure and its related notion larger half and
trial set, which are introduced by Helleseth, Kl{\o}ve, and Levenshtein, are
mainly used to derive the bounds.Comment: 5 pages, to appear in ISIT 200
Public-Key Encryption with Lazy Parties
In a public-key encryption scheme,
if a sender is not concerned about the security of a message and
is unwilling to generate costly randomness,
the security of the encrypted message can be compromised.
In this work, we characterize such \emph{lazy parties},
who are regraded as honest parties, but are unwilling to perform a costly task when they are not concerned about the security.
Specifically, we consider a rather simple setting in which
the costly task is to generate randomness used in algorithms,
and parties can choose either perfect randomness or a fixed string.
We model lazy parties as rational players who behave rationally to
maximize their utilities, and define a security game between the parties and an adversary.
Since a standard secure encryption scheme does not work in the setting,
we provide constructions of secure encryption schemes in various settings
Practical Card-Based Protocol for Three-Input Majority
We present a card-based protocol for computing a three-input majority using six cards. The protocol essentially consists of performing a simple XOR protocol two times. Compared to the existing protocols, our protocol does not require private operations other than choosing cards
Bit Security as Computational Cost for Winning Games with High Probability
We introduce a novel framework for quantifying the bit security of security games. Our notion is defined with an operational meaning that a -bit secure game requires a total computational cost of for winning the game with high probability, e.g., 0.99. We define the bit security both for search-type and decision-type games. Since we identify that these two types of games should be structurally different, we treat them differently but define the bit security using the unified framework to guarantee the same operational interpretation. The key novelty of our notion of bit security is to employ two types of adversaries: inner adversary and outer adversary. While the inner adversary plays a ``usual\u27\u27 security game, the outer adversary invokes the inner adversary many times to amplify the winning probability for the security game. We find from our framework that the bit security for decision games can be characterized by the information measure called the Rényi divergence of order of the inner adversary. The conventional ``advantage,\u27\u27 defined as the probability of winning the game, characterizes our bit security for search-type games. We present several security reductions in our framework for justifying our notion of bit security. Many of our results quantitatively match the results for the bit security notion proposed by Micciancio and Walter in 2018. In this sense, our bit security strengthens the previous notion of bit security by adding an operational meaning. A difference from their work is that, in our framework, the Goldreich-Levin theorem gives an optimal reduction only for ``balanced\u27\u27 adversaries who output binary values in a balanced manner
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